What's a cohabitation in French politics and what are the precedents? (2024)

Following Emmanuel Macron's dissolution of the Assemblée Nationale on Sunday, June 9, early parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 30 and July 7. At the end of these elections, it is far from certain that the presidential camp and its allies will retain their majority. If an opposition party wins an absolute majority, the president will be forced to appoint a prime minister from the party that won the elections. In French politics, this is known as "cohabitation."

Throughout the Fifth Republic, France has experienced three cohabitations after parliamentary elections were won by the opposition. The first took place from 1986 to 1988 when Socialist President François Mitterrand had conservative Jacques Chirac as prime minister; the second during Mitterrand's second term with conservative Edouard Balladur as prime minister, from 1993 to 1995; and finally, a longer one between Chirac as president and Socialist Lionel Jospin as prime minister from 1997 to 2002.

Since 2000, the switch to a five-year presidential term and the modification of the electoral calendar, where legislative elections immediately follow the presidential election, have made cohabitation situations quite unlikely. As a result, the president has consistently won a majority in the Assemblée Nationale in the weeks following his election.

Some observers see the risk of political paralysis in cohabitations, but they are viewed positively by the general public. Above all, a potential cohabitation raises concerns about the distribution of powers between the president and the prime minister.

The president relegated to a more secondary role

According to the Constitution, the country's domestic policy is clearly entrusted to members of the government:

• "The prime minister directs the action of the government, ensures the execution of laws and is responsible for national defense."
• "The government determines and conducts the policy of the nation, it has at its disposal the administration and the armed force."

"In the event of a cohabitation, power clearly lies in the relationship between the prime minister and the Assemblée Nationale," said Dominique Rousseau, a professor at the Université Paris-I-Panthéon-Sorbonne.

In these power-sharing situations, the president has a more secondary role. His own powers are limited, and it is notably he who:

• appoints the prime minister of his choice (who must, however, have the confidence of the Assemblée);
• presides over the council of ministers (but loses influence with them), signs decrees and ordinances and has the power to appoint civil and military state officials;
• can dissolve the Assemblée Nationale (once a year);
• can arrogate executive powers to himself in the event of a "serious and immediate" threat to institutions, the nation's independence, territorial integrity or the fulfillment of international commitments.

The foreign affairs and defense issue

The president is said to have a "reserved domain" in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs. However, the Constitution is far from categorical on this issue. The government "has the administration and the armed forces at its disposal" and "the prime minister is responsible for national defense," according to articles 20 and 21.

On the other hand, the Constitution makes the president the "guarantor of national independence and the integrity of national territory" (article 5), "the head of the armed forces" and says that he "presides over the councils and higher committees of national defense" (article 15). He holds the nuclear codes and he alone decides on the use of this force. In matters of foreign policy, the Constitution provides that the president negotiates and ratifies international treaties (Article 52) and accredits ambassadors (Article 14).

"This is the ambiguity of our 1958 Constitution," said Rousseau. "It reflects the opposing influences of Michel Debré [first prime minister of the Fifth Republic], who wanted a strong prime minister based on the British parliamentary model, and Charles de Gaulle, who wanted to give more weight to the president." This ambiguity obliges the prime minister and the president to reach a certain understanding. This is why, during the three cohabitations, it was customary to choose defense and foreign affairs ministers who appealed to both men in power, in order to avoid friction. "In the past, there was consensus in these areas, but today there are real differences over the role of the European Union or the war in Ukraine, particularly between Emmanuel Macron and the Rassemblement National [far-right]. This seems much more unstable and is likely to pose problems in the event of cohabitations," said the constitutionalist.

Real power to cause trouble

• Powerful voice

While a cohabitation turns the president into a leader of the opposition, his office allows his voice to carry considerable weight with the French people. During the first cohabitation, Mitterrand held a press conferences in which he criticized the policies of Chirac's government. Less than a month after the start of the third cohabitation, in 1997, President Chirac took advantage of the usual July 14 television interview to criticize the first decisions of Jospin's government. He didn't hold back thereafter either.

• The power of nuisance

As the president is the only person empowered to sign decrees and ordinances in the Council of Ministers, the main executive organ of the government, he also has the power to act as a nuisance in the face of an opposition government.

- The decree in the Council of Ministers is a regulatory act (which lays down a law) signed by the president and does not need parliamentary approval.

- The ordinance is a normative text (which sets out a law) presented by the government to adopt measures without going through the usual legislative procedure (Assemblée Nationale and Sénat). Even though the president is the only person empowered to sign it, Parliament must first authorize the government to issue an ordinance and then ratify it.

In July 1986, Mitterrand refused to sign the ordinances on denationalization presented by Chirac's government, which had obtained parliamentary authorization to legislate by ordinance. These provided for the privatization of over 60 industrial groups, undoing the work done by the Socialists when they came to power. Faced with the president's refusal, Chirac had to transform the draft ordinances into a bill, which was quickly passed by the Assemblée Nationale through the use of Article 49.3 of the Constitution, allowing for a bill to be passed without a vote. Although Mitterrand did not have the power to block the bill, this maneuver enabled him to avoid abandoning his convictions, while repositioning himself on the left. He did so again in October 1986 by refusing to sign the ordinances on electoral boundaries, then the one on flexible working hours in December 1986.

• The power to dissolve the Assemblée Nationale

Finally, the president retains the considerable power to dissolve the Assemblée Nationale. This possibility was unlikely during the first two cohabitations, which were limited to two years pending the presidential election. However, it became believable after the early legislative elections of 1997. After Chirac dissolved the Assemblée Nationale, he had to wait a year before being allowed to call for a new dissolution.

In 1998, he once again had this power, which he did not use, but which acted like the sword of Damocles hanging over Jospin's head. "It's a system of reciprocal neutralization," said political scientist Garrigou. "The president cannot put forth the program on which he was elected, while the prime minister has to govern while avoiding the missteps that would motivate the president to dissolve the Assemblée to win back the legislative elections." For this professor emeritus in political science at the Université Paris-Nanterre, "Lionel Jospin spent the last four years of his government living with the anxiety of dissolution, and did nothing but navigate with the polls." The long and negative experience lasting from 1997 to 2002 led the two leaders to reform the electoral system to minimize the chances of cohabitation.

Measures taken during cohabitation

It was evident from the outset of cohabitation that the 1958 Constitution emphasized the prime minister, who enjoyed the support of the Assemblée. "Despite the conflictual nature of cohabitation, the major fear of an impossibility to govern has not been borne out," wrote Alain Garrigou in his book La Politique en France ("Politics in France") in 2017.

According to the writer, 105 laws were passed during the first cohabitation period, without there ever being a definitive blockage. Chirac's government was able to unravel what the previous government had done: As early as 1986, it privatized companies nationalized in 1981, reversed the introduction of proportional representation in legislative elections decided by the Socialists a year earlier and reintroduced majority voting. In August 1986, the government canceled the concessions of two private TV channels, TV6 and La Cinq. "It also passed laws on the security and residence of foreigners: expulsion by prefectural decision, restriction of access to the 10-year residence permit," said Garrigou.

The second cohabitation, that of Mitterrand and Balladur, was not synonymous with paralysis either. The conservative prime minister was able to continue the previous cohabitationion's unfinished neoliberal program. A law privatizing 21 companies was enacted in July 1993. A pension reform applicable to private-sector employees was adopted: The contribution period required to obtain a full pension was gradually increased from 37.5 to 40 years, and the amount of the pension was calculated on the basis of 25 years' salary, compared with 10 previously.

According to the writer, 105 laws were passed during the first cohabitation period, without there ever being a number of left-wing measures. In December 1997, it presented its reform to reduce working hours. Chirac condemned it as an "authoritarian and general measure," but the 35-hour working week reform passed – through two laws, in 1998 and 2000, before being applicable to all companies from 2002. Among the main laws passed under this government, and to which Chirac was opposed, were also the law introducing universal health coverage in July 1999 and the creation of the civil solidarity pact in October 1999.